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The problem
Monitoring the performance of the economic and monetary
union (EMU) requires reliable statistics. However, the quality
of European fiscal statistics has been repeatedly questioned
because they are not always of the requisite accuracy and
reliability. There has been under-reporting  of the true size
of government deficit and national public debt. This raises
the spectre of potential conflicts of interest as governments
may not be keen to release information that appears to
demonstrate inability to achieve fiscal targets. Last year's
allegations concerning misreporting of Greek statistics is a
case in point. Portuguese and Italian fiscal statistics are also
under re-assessment by Eurostat, although weaknesses in
national statistical systems are widespread.
As early as November 2002, the European Commission
anticipated this problem but it was not until recently, June
2005, that it proposed a code of practice and invited the
European Council to consider the "professional inde-
pendence" of the European statistical system.1
In December 2004 the Commission published measures
to improve the governance of the European system of fiscal
statistics. These measures outlined three main lines of
action:
• Enabling Eurostat to monitor public accounts directly.
• Strengthening the operational capacities of Eurostat
and the Directorate-General for Economic and Financial
Affairs.
• Enhancing the independence, integrity and accountability
of the national statistical institutes by establishing
European standards based on a code of conduct.
Despite declarations at the highest political level in favour
of improved statistical governance and notwithstanding the
many and detailed ideas put forth by the Commission,
national statistical institutes might not have the requisite
independence to collect and disseminate information that
may not provide support to the avowed policy objectives or
public pronouncements of incumbent governments.
This short article examines what has been proposed and
why it is not yet adequate to deal with the problem of
potential political interference in the work of national
statistical institutes.
The current framework
The compilation of official statistics in the EU is based on
Article 285 of the European Community Treaty, which states:
"...The production of Community statistics shall conform
to impartiality, reliability, objectivity, scientific indepen-
dence, cost-effectiveness and statistical confidentiality;
it shall not entail excessive burdens on economic ope-
rators".
Furthermore, Council Regulation 322/97 on Community
Statistics stipulates that:
"...Community statistics shall be governed by the prin-
ciples of impartiality, reliability, relevance, cost-effecti-
veness, statistical confidentiality and transparency".
Nonetheless, the national statistical offices world-wide are
expected to comply with international standards, known as
"the 10 fundamental principles", adopted by the United
Nations Statistical Commission in  April 1994.
The Eurozone needs reliable statistics. It is important to know whether the policies
implemented by Member State produce the intended effects. Since statistics may
reveal policy failure, it is also important for the integrity of the system that statistical
institutes are protected from political interference. In the recently recommended
measures, regarding the independence, integrity and accountability of the national
and Community statistical authorities, the Commission should have spelled out the
meaning of independence in terms of the needed functional or institutional
independence rather than refer to a vague "professional" independence.
The European System
of Fiscal Statistics
Needs Improvement
By Dr Nancy Xenaki  Dr Nancy Xenaki  Dr Nancy Xenaki  Dr Nancy Xenaki  Dr Nancy Xenaki,         Seconded National Expert – EIPA Maastricht
T
h
e
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
a
n
 
S
y
s
t
e
m
 
o
f
 
F
i
s
c
a
l
 
S
t
a
t
i
s
t
i
c
s
 
N
e
e
d
s
 
I
m
p
r
o
v
e
m
e
n
t
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
C
O
M
M
E
N
T
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○
○E
I
P
A
S
C
O
P
E
 
 
B
u
l
l
e
t
i
n
 
2
0
0
5
/
1
www.eipa.nl
46
A global review on the implementation of the fundamental
principles conducted in 2003 by the United Nations Statistical
Division (UNSD), showed that institutional weaknesses is
indeed a  problem  for many national statistical institutes.2
Towards institutional benchmarking
and independence …
In June 2005 the Commission recommended the adoption
of a code of Practice on the independence, integrity and
accountability of the national and Community statistical
authorities. The Code  introduces the concept of "professional
independence" meaning the independence of the statistical
authorities from other policy, regulatory or administrative
departments and bodies, as well as from private sector
operators.
According to the Com-
mission, the introduction
of the concept of "profes-
sional independence", as
the number one principle
of the proposed code of
Practice, goes beyond the
current provision in Article
285 of the Treaty that
requires the European
statistics to be "scientifi-
cally independent". The
Commission argues that
the new concept of pro-
fessional independence
guarantees the quality of the produced statistics while at the
same time respects the different legal and administrative
arrangements in the Member States.
Furthermore, the Commission advocates a monitoring
process that will be based on reports on implementation
and peer reviews carried out with the assistance of a task
force and an external advisory body. At the end of this
lengthy and laborious procedure the Commission will
present a report to the European Parliament and the
Council.
Finally, after three years and on the basis of the results
of the implementation procedure and if the Commission
finds it necessary it might propose a legally binding
instrument in the form of a directive. This is an ambitious
programme with innovative features.
… But will they make any difference?
The Commission communication of June 2005 is the result
of a long process that started in 1994 when it became
apparent that budgetary statistics had to be improved to
support the implementation, monitoring as well as the
assessment of the monetary and fiscal European policies.
The uneven implementation of the stability and growth
pact is partly the result of Member State inability  to bring
public budgets close to balance or in surplus. But it is
abetted by the fact that statistics are not always of the
requisite accuracy and reliability.
Unfortunately the Commission measures are not strong
enough to remedy that problem. The two most innovative
features of the proposed code are, first, the concept of
"professional independence" that complements the concepts
of  "scientific independence" and  "impartiality" provided in
the EC Treaty and second, the implementing procedure
based on specific indicators and peer review.
The Commission attempts a compromise between high
quality statistics and respect for the national arrangements
on collection and processing of official statistics. However,
besides the different legal and administrative arrangements
in the Member States, there are also important differences
in aspects of governance such as transparency and
confidentiality. Since most statistical institutes are public
services, it is difficult for them to act independently even
when statistical laws refer to such independence.
Apparently making
national statistical insti-
tutes independent from
direct government control
is resisted both by politi-
cians and by the staff of
those institutes, but for
different reasons. Govern-
ments want to maintain
direct control on  vital in-
formation, while staff fears
loss of privileges such as
permanent employment.
The Commission
should have spelled out
the meaning of indepen-
dence in terms of the needed functional or institutional
independence rather than refer to a vague "professional"
independence.
It also remains to be seen whether peer reviews will add
value or whether peers will not dare speak out against other
peers as happened with the ECOFIN decision of 25
November 2003, when the Council stepped back from
censuring Germany and France for repeated breaching of
the stability and growth pact.
In conclusion, the Eurozone needs reliable statistics. It is
important to know whether the policies implemented by
Member State produce the intended effects. Since statistics
may reveal policy failure, it is also important for the integrity
of the system that statistical institutes are protected from
political interference. The Commission proposals for
strengthening the European and national statistical practices
are necessary. The question is whether they are also
sufficient. ::
NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES NOTES
1 COM (2005) 217 final / 25.5.2005 "Communication from
the Commission to the European Parliament and to the
Council".
2 The survey was a self-assessment exercise. The results are
based on 112 responses out of 194 distributed question-
naires.
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The Commission proposals
for strengthening the
European and national
statistical practices
are necessary.
The question is whether
they are also sufficient.
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